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PROFESSOR ANDREW F. TUCH
COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULES FOR SPECIAL PURPOSE ACQUISITION COMPANIES, SHELL
COMPANIES, AND PROJECTIONS (MARCH 2022)
RE: FILE NO. S7-13-22
June 13, 2022
Vanessa A. Countryman
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street NE
Washington DC 20549-1090
Via Electronic Mail (rule-comments@sec.gov)
Dear Ms. Countryman
I submit this comment letter in response to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
Release Nos. 33-11048; 34-94546; IC-34549; File Number S7-13-22 (the “Release”), which
proposes rules (the “Proposed Rules”) regarding Special Purpose Acquisition Companies
(SPACs), Shell Companies, and Projections.1 In light of the limited timeframe for providing
comments, I focus on aspects of Parts II and III of the Release.
By way of background, I am a law professor who has researched and written in the areas
of securities regulation and corporate law. In recent years, my writing has focused on SPACs,
de-SPACs, going-private transactions, and the liability exposure of financial advisors,
including underwriters and M&A advisors.2 The views expressed in this letter are solely my
own, and the institutional affiliation provided below is given for identification purposes only.
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See SEC, Release Nos. 13-11048; 34-94546; IC-34549; File No. S7-13-22 (March 2022) (“Release”).

See, e.g., Andrew F. Tuch & Joel Seligman, The Further Erosion of Investor Protection: Expanded Exemptions,
SPAC Mergers and Direct Listings, IOWA L. REV. (current draft attached and soon available on ssrn); Andrew F.
Tuch, M&A Advisor Liability: A Wrong Without a Remedy?, 45 DEL. J. CORP. L. 177 (2021); Andrew F. Tuch,
Managing Management Buyouts: A US-UK Comparative Analysis, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 477 (A. Afsharipour & M. Gelter eds., 2021); Andrew F. Tuch, Fiduciary Principles in
Banking Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (E. J. Criddle, P. B. Miller & R. H. Sitkoff eds.,
2019); Andrew F. Tuch, The Remaking of Wall Street, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 315 (2017); Andrew F. Tuch, Banker
Loyalty in Mergers and Acquisitions, 94 TEXAS L. REV. 1079 (2016).

I. PROPOSED NEW SUBPART 1600 OF REGULATION S-K
A. Proposed Rules Modeled on Rules Applicable to Going-Private Transactions
Many key reforms in the proposed new Subpart 1600 are modeled on provisions in 17
CFR 240.13e-3 (“Rule 13e-3”) that apply to certain going-private transactions.
Proposed Item 1605 would require disclosure of the background, material terms, and
effects of a de-SPAC transaction. Proposed Item 1605 is modeled, in part, on Item 1004(a)(2)
and Item 1013(b) of Regulation M-A, which apply to going-private transactions under Rule
13e-3.3
Proposed Item 1606 would require SPACs to state whether they reasonably believe the
de-SPAC and any related financing transaction are fair to the SPAC’s unaffiliated security
holders and to discuss the material factors upon which such belief is based. Proposed Item
1606 is modeled on Item 1013 of Regulation M-A, which applies to going-private
transactions under Rule 13e-3.
Proposed Item 1607 would require SPACs to state whether the SPAC or SPAC sponsor
has received any report, opinion or appraisal from an outside party relating to the transaction
and summarize that third party opinion, among other matters. Proposed Item 1607 is modeled
on Item 1014 of Regulation M-A, which applies to going-private transactions under Rule
13e-3.
The Proposed Rules would also amend Exchange Act Rules 14a-6 and 14c-2, as well as
the instructions to Forms S-4 and F-4, to require a minimum 20-day dissemination period for
disclosure documents filed in connection with de-SPAC transactions. These amendments are
also modeled on provisions in Rule 13e-3.4
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Release, at 47 n. 88.
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See 17 CFR § 140.13e-3(f).
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In footnotes to the Release, the Commission briefly justifies its recourse to Rule 13e-3,
stating:
In our view, these rules [applicable to going-privates subject to Rule 13e-3]
are appropriate models for the proposed specialized disclosure requirements
for de-SPAC transactions, in that … the same potential for self-interested
transactions exists in de-SPAC transactions as in going-private transactions. 5
Elsewhere in the Release, the commission explains
In our view, the disclosure requirements in Rule 13e-3 provide an appropriate
model for the proposed requirements with respect to de-SPAC transactions, in
that the conflicts of interests and misaligned incentives inherent in goingprivate transactions are similar to those often present in de-SPAC
transactions.6
B. An Analogy with Going-Private Transactions
To begin, I agree that de-SPACs are analogous to going-private transactions subject to
Rule 13e-3 in the conflicts of interests they may create. As Professor Joel Seligman and I
argued in The Further Erosion of Investor Protection: Expanded Exemptions, SPAC Mergers
and Direct Listings,7 key participants in both types of transactions have opportunities and
incentives to engage in self-dealing, to the detriment of unaffiliated security holders. For deSPACs, these securities holders are public SPAC shareholders unaffiliated with the sponsor;
for going-private transactions subject to Rule 13e-3, these security holders are public
shareholders in the target unaffiliated with the acquirer. 8 In both transaction types,

5

Release, at 47 n. 88.
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Release, at 52 n. 96.

7

Tuch & Seligman, supra note 2.
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Id. at 53 (footnotes omitted) (“We can also analogize the regulation of SPAC mergers with that of going-private
transactions under federal securities law. The quintessential going-private transaction is the management buyout
(MBO), a transaction that, like SPAC mergers, creates conflicts of interest for transaction participants, including
corporate fiduciaries. In MBOs, managers of a firm participate in buying the firm, a position that pits managers’
self-interest against their fiduciary duties of loyalty. Federal securities law responds to these transactions by
requiring enhanced disclosure. Rule 13e-3 compels an issuer and affiliates engaged in a going-private transaction to
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countervailing forces also limit the effects of conflicts of interests: in going-private
transactions, the requirement for target shareholders’ approval disciplines conflicted target
managers; in de-SPACs, the right of SPAC shareholders to redeem their shares may deter
sponsors and directors from proposing value-decreasing deals, since widespread redemptions
may leave a SPAC with insufficient cash to proceed with a de-SPAC. An analogy exists,
inviting recourse to Rule 13e-3 because of its evident concern with mitigating the risk of
conflict in going-privates.
While I therefore applaud the Commission’s use of Rule 13e-3 as a model for reforms,
the Proposed Rules modeled on Rule 13e-3 run into problems. First, I question whether deSPACs, as defined in proposed Item 1601, give rise to “the same” or “similar” potential for
self-dealing as going-private transactions subject to Rule 13e-3 sufficient to justify the
application of provisions modeled so closely on Rule 13e-3. Second, I question whether deSPACs ought to be subject to such extensive rules when, under the Proposed Rules, deSPACS would also be subject to enhanced Section 11 liability. This concern goes to the
cumulative deterrent effect of Section 11 liability and provisions modeled on Rule 13e-3.
Third, I draw attention to conflicts and uncertainties in empirical evidence on de-SPACs, an
understanding of which should limit regulation designed to steer private companies toward
traditional IPOs and away from de-SPACs. Finally, I have particular concerns about
proposed Item 1606, which will encourage if not practically require the use of fairness
opinions in de-SPACs.
C. Definitional Issues
Consider first how de-SPACs, as defined in proposed Item 1601, and going-private
transactions subject to Rule 13e-3 compare in exposing unaffiliated security holders to the
risk of conflict. By definition, going-private transactions subject to Rule 13e-3 create severe
conflicts of interest for corporate fiduciaries. The provision applies to a “Rule 13e-3
transaction,” defined, in part, as any transaction or series of transactions involving one or
file with the SEC and to publicly disseminate a Schedule 13E-3, which requires disclosure of the transaction’s
purposes and a written justification of its structure. The target company and its affiliates must attest that they
reasonably believe the transaction is fair to shareholders and must explain why this is so.”).
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more of certain enumerated transactions. The enumerated transactions are transactions
between a target and an “affiliate.” They include a tender offer of any equity security made
by the issuer of such class of securities by an affiliate of such issuer.9 So defined, goingprivate transactions subject to Rule 13e-3 suffer from a structural conflict since the same
individuals owing fiduciary duties, often a target company’s managers, are on both sides of
the transaction. In the quintessential going-private transaction subject to Rule 13e-3,
[M]anagers of a firm—who are corporate officers and often also directors—
participate in buying the firm. Managers participate in the sense of having
ongoing roles in the surviving firm, usually as owners and managers. [Such a
transaction] therefore puts participating managers on both the buy- and sellsides of a transaction, a position that pits managers’ self-interest against their
fiduciary duties of loyalty, creating conflicts of interest. Potentially
exacerbating these conflicts, the private equity firms that sponsor these deals
(by partnering with managers) usually enlist support from managers early in
the deal process, a practice that may undermine arm’s-length bargaining over
the terms of sale and deter competing bids. 10
In de-SPACs, corporate fiduciaries (SPAC sponsors and SPAC directors) typically face
conflicts of interest. These conflicts result from compensation arrangements under which
SPAC sponsors and SPAC directors receive SPAC shares that have value only if the SPAC
undertakes a de-SPAC. Since sponsors and directors receive these shares for nominal
consideration, they may profit from a value-decreasing de-SPAC, giving them incentives to
undertake a de-SPAC even if it harms unaffiliated security holders. 11 As is now well known,
9

17 CFR 140.13e-3 (a)(3)(i)(B).

10

Deborah A. DeMott, Directors’ Duties in Management Buyouts and Leveraged Recapitalizations, 49 OHIO ST. L.
J. 517 (1988); Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Form Over Substance: The Value of Corporate Process and
Management Buy-Outs, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849 (2011); Iman Anabtawi, Predatory Management Buyouts, 49 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1285 (2016); Andrew F. Tuch, Managing Management Buyouts: A US-UK Comparative Analysis, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 477, 478 (A. Afsharipour & M. Gelter eds.,
2021).
11
See Release, at 32-33. As to the conflicts these compensation arrangements produce for SPAC sponsors and
SPAC directors, see In re MultiPlan Corp. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 2021-0300-LWW (Del. Ch. Jan. 3,
2022) at 43-47 (regarding sponsor incentives) and 48-50 (regarding board incentives).
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the compensation arrangements for SPAC IPO underwriters may exacerbate their incentives
to ensure that a SPAC undertakes a de-SPAC within the required investment window.
Whether de-SPACs give rise to the same or a similar risk of conflicts as going-privates
subject to Rule 13e-3 is important since the Release provides this empirical claim to justify
its decision to subject de-SPACs to onerous provisions modeled on those applicable to
certain going-private transactions.12 But even accepting this claim, a key problem arises with
the Proposed Rules. Going-private transactions subject to Rule 13e-3 are defined in terms
that assure a severe conflict of interest exists (that the same party is on both sides of the
transaction) while proposed Item 1601 fails to define de-SPACs to assure that any conflict
arises. Under proposed Item 1601(b), a special purpose acquisition company means,
generally speaking, a company with a business plan to undertake a SPAC IPO and either
complete a de-SPAC within a specified time frame or return the remaining funds from the
SPAC IPO to shareholders. The definition does not assure the existence of a conflict of
interest; for instance, no mention is made of sponsors’ or directors’ compensation. As
defined, a company with such a business plan is not comparable to a going-private
transaction subject to Rule 13e-3 since corporate fiduciaries do not necessarily have conflicts
of interest. Similarly, a de-SPAC transaction is not defined in proposed Item 1601(a) in terms
that assure the existence of a conflict of interest; generally speaking, it is the business
combination of a special purpose acquisition company and one or more target companies.
Nor do the Proposed Rules define SPAC sponsor or target company (in proposed items
1601(c) and 1601(d) respectively) in terms that suggest a close analogy with going-private
transactions subject to Rule 13e-3.
Provisions modeled on Rule 13e-3 are therefore insensitive to the possibility that the
terms of de-SPACs will change to minimize SPAC sponsors’ and directors’ opportunities and
incentives for self-dealing. Under the Proposed Rules, SPACs will be subject to rules
modeled on Rule 13e-3 regardless of the conflicts of interest they pose. It is not far-fetched to
think that material changes will occur in SPAC sponsors’ or SPAC directors’ compensation
or that the terms of SPACs will otherwise evolve to diminish conflicts between the interests
12

See supra notes 5 and 6 and accompanying text.
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of corporate fiduciaries and those of unaffiliated security holders. Indeed, litigation alleging
fiduciary breach by SPAC sponsors and SPAC directors in de-SPACs is already creating
incentives for reform of market practices. (Consider, for instance, a SPAC board comprised
of a majority of directors who are independent of the SPAC sponsor and are not compensated
with “founder” shares). It follows that rules in Subpart 1600 modeled on Rule 13e-3 may be,
or become, over-broad; they are justified by reference to going-private transactions that
necessarily raise severe conflicts of interest but may themselves apply to transactions that
raise no such concerns. Even if de-SPAC transactions currently create the same or similar
potential for self-dealing as going-private transactions subject to Rule 13e-3, as the Release
claims,13 I recommend that it more narrowly tailor the class of de-SPACs to which the most
onerous rules modeled on Rule 13e-3 apply. Since the definitions in proposed Item 1601
have various purposes, it would be more sensible to narrow the range of de-SPACs to which
the most onerous rules apply than to redefine terms in proposed Item 1601.
A respone to this definitional problem would be to ensure that the most onerous rules
modeled on Rule 13e-3 apply not to de-SPACs generally but only to those de-SPACs that
raise risks of severe conflicts of interest. The most onerous such provisions are proposed
Item 1606 (concerning the fairness of de-SPACs and related financing transactions) and
proposed Item 1607 (concerning reports, opinions, appraisals and negotiations).
This concern about the breadth of the definition of de-SPACs is all the more serious since
Rule 13e-3 does not apply to all going-private transactions. In applying Rule 13e-3, issues
arise as to who is an “affiliate” and who is “engaged in” a relevant transaction, creating room
for deal planners to structure going-privates to minimize the risk of conflict and avoid the
application of Rule 13e-3. According to commentators:
[T]here are instances in which Rule 13e-3 may be avoided even where
management is involved in the [going-private] deal. This may be true, for
example, where there are no, or only preliminary or non-binding arrangements

13

See supra notes 5 and 6 and accompanying text.

7

with management at the time of signing such that the parties can argue that no
seller affiliate was engaged in the transaction at the relevant time.14
Notably, because it applies to going-private transactions that raise risks of severe conflict,
Rule 13e-3 provides incentives for deal planners to structure transactions to avoid these risks
and thereby avoid the application of Rule 13e-3, such as by not compromising the incentives
of corporate fiduciaries at the relevant time. If de-SPACs are to be subject to rules largely
modeled on Rule 13e-3, on the basis that de-SPACs give rise to the same (or similar) risk of
conflict, the Proposed Rules should ensure that only de-SPACs creating similarly severe risks
will fall within their ambit. That requires, at a minimum, restricting the de-SPACs to which
the most onerous rules modeled on Rule 13e-3 are subject, in particular, Items 1606 and
1607.
D. Cumulative Deterrent Effect of Proposed Rules
The second question is whether the Proposed Rules would subject de-SPACs to heavier
regulatory burdens than those applicable to either going-private transactions subject to Rule
13e-3 or traditional IPOs. I suggest they do since, in addition to subjecting de-SPACs to rules
modeled on Rule 13e-3, the Proposed Rules would subject the SPAC transaction participants
to enhanced Section 11 liability under the Securities Act of 1933. This matters because
Section 11, the most potent liability provision in the federal securities regulatory arsenal,
strongly deters misconduct by corporate directors, performing a similar function to rules
targeting conflicts of interest, including provisions under Rule 13e-3. 15
The threat of Section 11 liability distinguishes de-SPACs from going-private transactions
subject to Rule 13e-3. Transaction participants in going-private transactions subject to Rule
13e-3 rarely face the prospect of Section 11 liability, a fact that underscores the importance
of Rule 13e-3 for these transactions. De-SPACs may also face tougher regulation under state
corporate law than going-private transactions subject to Rule 13e-3, although courts have had

14

FRANCI J. BLASSBERG, THE BEST OF THE DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 72 (2006).

15

As to Section 11, see 9 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION 322-60 (5th ed.,
2018).
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few opportunities to articulate any differences. In In Re Multiplan Corp. Stockholders
Litigation,16 the Delaware Court of Chancery suggests that the conduct of corporate
fiduciaries will be assessed under the rigorous entire-fairness standard, whereas corporate
fiduciaries’ conduct in going-private transactions typically enjoys BJR protection due to the
use of cleansing mechanisms, including the use of fully informed and uncoerced votes of
disinterested stockholders.17 It is unclear from MultiPlan whether the use of cleansing
mechanisms by corporate fiduciaries in de-SPACs will provide BJR protection to corporate
fiduciaries. If they do not, Delaware fiduciary law will have greater deterrent effect on
transaction participants in de-SPACs than it does on corporate fiduciaries in going-private
transactions subject to Rule 13e-3. Even leaving aside state fiduciary law, federal securities
law would more strongly deter misconduct, including self-dealing, occurring in de-SPACs
than in going-private transactions subject to Rule 13e-3, a result of the application of Section
11 under the Proposed Rules. This heavier regulatory burden on de-SPACs is not justified by
analysis in the Release or by other evidence of which I am aware.
In addition to subjecting de-SPACs to stricter regulation than going-private transactions
subject to Rule 13e-3, the Proposed Rules would subject them to stricter regulation than
traditional IPOs, this despite the SEC’s expressed objective to “align more closely the
treatment of private operating companies entering the public markets through de-SPAC
transactions with that of companies conduct traditional [IPOs]” and “to provide investors
with disclosures and liability protections comparable to those that would be present if the
private operating company were to conduct a traditional firm commitment [IPO].” 18
Traditional firm commitment IPOs are not subject to the requirements of Rule 13e-3, even
though founders and promoters in IPOs have interests in conflict with those of IPO investors.
16

No. 2021-0300-LWW, Del. Ch. Ct, Jan. 3, 2022.

17

Corwin v KKR Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del.2015). For a more detailed explanation, see Andrew F. Tuch,
Managing Management Buyouts: A US-UK Comparative Analysis, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 477, 483-85, 490 (A. Afsharipour & M. Gelter eds., 2021); Iman Anabtawi, Predatory
Management Buyouts, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1285, 1308 (2016); Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Form
Over Substance: The Value of Corporate Process and Management Buy-Outs, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 895-97
(2011).
18

Release, at 66.
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For example, in determining the IPO offer price, founders’ interests are in tension with those
of public IPO investors. It is this conflict of interest that scholars and others point to in
justifying gatekeeper liability, including Section 11 liability. 19 Although I regard Section 11
liability as justified in the context of de-SPACs,20 the imposition of such liability must be
accounted for in determining the extent to which de-SPACs are subject to rules modeled on
Rule 13e-3.
In short, the Proposed Rules would subject de-SPACs to more onerous regulation than
either going-private transactions subject to Rule 13e-3 or traditional IPOs. A way to address
this is to apply Items 1606 and 1607 more selectively, to those de-SPACs raising heightened
risks of self-dealing by SPAC fiduciaries, or perhaps not to apply these proposed items at all.
Reforms should provide transaction participants with incentives to structure de-SPACs to
minimize the risk of conflict. Reforms should also account for the threat of liability that
transaction participants face under Section 11. For example, proposed Items 1606 and 1607
might be applied only to SPACs that lack cleansing mechanisms such independent boards or
board committees to review and approve transactions.
E. Empirical Evidence on the net costs of De-SPACs
The available empirical evidence about de-SPACs has important points of agreement and
disagreement. The available evidence does not suggest that de-SPACs have created net
collective harm; in fact, even the most critical evidence of de-SPACs reveals the opposite.
The evidence is uncertain on whether de-SPACs are more or less expensive from target
companies’ perspective than traditional IPOs. The evidence is also uncertain as to the extent
of any benefits that de-SPACs offer target companies over traditional IPOs. If de-SPACs are
more expensive for target companies than traditional IPOs, as some scholars claim, we can
infer that target companies have nevertheless undertaken these transactions because they
offer significant benefits not provided by traditional IPOs. An assessment of the evidence
suggests that the Commission should not impose reforms that reveal a regulatory preference
19

Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 614-21
(1984); Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239,
288–89 (1984); Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1594 (2010).
20
For reasons developed in detail in Tuch & Seligman, supra note 2, 46-54.

10

for traditional IPOs over de-SPACs, or vice versa, or for rules that would channel private
companies intending to “go public” away from one type of transaction to the other. Reforms
having this effect lack a clear basis in either the SEC’s analysis or scholarly research.
It is not apparent that they weigh the cumulative effect of Section 11 liability and
provisions modeled on Rule 13e-3, with the result that they subject de-SPACs to more
onerous regulation than either going-private transactions subject to Rule 13e-3 or traditional
IPOs. To be sure, unaffiliated security holders need greater protection, but regulators must be
careful not to tilt the regulatory balance so firmly against de-SPACs.
A solution is to limit the extent to which provisions modeled on Rule 13e-3 apply to deSPACs.
For convenience, I refer to a synthesis of the empirical evidence that Professor Joel
Seligman and I offer in The Further Erosion of Investor Protection: Expanded Exemptions,
SPAC Mergers and Direct Listings (omitting references):21
[S]cholarly views diverge on which of the remaining transaction participants
[SPACs or target operating companies] bear the high costs of raising funds via a
SPAC merger: target shareholders or non-redeeming SPAC, a group that includes
retail investors. The answer will depend on the terms of the agreement the merger
parties strike and, in particular, whether targets negotiating mergers account for
the heavily dilutive effect of founder shares, warrants, and rights, a consequence
of which is that SPACs hold less cash per share than their $10 nominal share
value suggests. Klausner et al. suggest that, in negotiating with SPACs, targets
protect their interest by accounting for SPAC’s dilutive structure. Pointing to the
substantial price declines SPACs experience after a merger and to their finding of
a strong correlation between those declines and the extent of dilution, Klausner et
al. infer that “SPAC shareholders bear the costs … embedded in the SPAC
structure,” although “they extract some [modest] surplus from the deal, so their
net losses are partially mitigated.” Non-redeeming SPAC shareholders
21

Tuch & Seligman, supra note 2, at 48-54.
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“unwittingly subsidize” target companies, with the result that, from a target’s
perspective, going public via a SPAC “has been cheap—cheaper than an IPO.”
The evidence presented by Klausner et al. that SPAC shareholders—rather than
target companies—bear the brunt of the expense is equivocal. Considering
immediate post-merger prices, rather than the longer-term post-merger prices on
which Klausner et al. base their inferences, and taking an alternative perspective
to valuing IPO costs, Klausner et al. report the opposite result, that “SPACs would
seem to be very expensive for target companies.” But Klausner et al. are skeptical
of this alternative approach, suggesting instead that SPAC post-merger prices may
be slow to adjust. Rather than rely on a SPAC’s immediate post-merger price,
Klausner et al. point to evidence that SPAC prices decline in the weeks and
months post-merger, which they interpret as consistent with the view that SPAC
investors are bearing the cost of SPAC mergers. Again, however, this
interpretation hinges on the view that SPAC prices are not highly informationally
efficient but rather adjust slowly, a plausible but contestable claim.
Gahng and coauthors prefer the alternative approach, regarding the costs at the
time of merger as falling on target shareholders rather than SPAC shareholders.
Gahng and coauthors therefore pose the difficult question of why target
companies would engage in SPAC mergers rather than less costly conventional
IPOs. Klausner et al. need not answer that question, as they suggest that, from a
target’s perspective, SPAC mergers are cheaper than traditional IPOs, making the
appeal of SPACs more obvious, especially considering the higher regulatory
burdens traditional IPOs carry. But Klausner et al. must explain why SPAC
shareholders would have agreed to bear these costs, a question they cannot answer
definitively. Under both interpretations, however, the bottom line is that SPAC
mergers have been significantly more costly than traditional IPOs, largely due to
their highly dilutive structure. Nonredeeming SPAC shareholders have also fared
poorly, with SPAC shares generally declining in price post-merger.

12

In addition to disputing the relative cost of SPAC mergers and traditional IPOs, scholars

contest the extent to which SPAC mergers provide unique benefits. Scholars
speculate that SPAC mergers offer advantages for firms with information that is
difficult to convey to investors or firms that investors have difficulty valuing.
SPAC deals are thought to be speedier to execute, have more certain deal terms,
and benefit from sponsors giving advice and certification to private companies. If
these benefits exist, they might well explain why so many companies have
preferred SPAC mergers when, on Gahng et al.’s view, SPAC mergers are more
expensive than traditional IPOs for target companies. However, Klausner et al.
doubt whether SPAC mergers are executed more quickly or result in more certain
deal terms. They accept that sponsors may provide value in selecting and advising
targets and that PIPE investors may certify the transaction and thus aid in price
discovery. But Klausner et al. suggest that these benefits are available at less cost
by integrating certain features of SPACs into traditional IPOs.
The point, however, is that dispute exists as to the relative costs of SPAC mergers
and traditional IPOs and to the existence and size of any benefits SPAC mergers
provide. Moreover, even critics of de-SPACs find that during their study period
de-SPACs created social value, meaning that these transactions provide, on
average, a net collective gain among all parties involved. This suggests that with
changed terms, de-SPACs might also be value-increasing for non-redeeming
SPAC shareholders, although that would mean lower returns for SPAC sponsors,
IPO investors, and underwriters. The evidence therefore fails to establish that
traditional IPOs strictly dominate SPAC mergers by providing greater welfare, or
vice versa, suggesting that reforms should avoid seeking to channel private
companies away from one type of transaction to the other.
Rather than targeting areas requiring reform, the Proposed Rules, in cumulative effect,
display a preference for traditional IPOs, an approach unsupported by the available empirical
evidence.

13

F. Concerns about proposed Item 1606 22
Proposed Item 1606 would require SPACs to state whether they reasonably believe the
de-SPAC and any related financing transaction are fair or unfair to the SPAC’s unaffiliated
security holders and to discuss the material factors upon which such belief is based. Although
framed as a disclosure provision, the proposed rule requires a SPAC’s board to make a
reasonable determination as to fairness, a requirement that, if adopted, would likely lead
boards to engage financial advisors to provide fairness opinions, to aid in their decisionmaking. Indeed, numerous commentators have pointed to fairness opinions as a way for a
SPAC’s board to substantiate the reasonableness of its belief as to a transaction’s fairness to
unaffiliated security holders.23
However, fairness opinions that would be responsive to proposed Item 1606 confront
major obstacles. Financial advisors giving these opinions would need to opine on the fairness
of a de-SPAC to unaffiliated security holders. Such an opinion would be far from routine. As
the Commission highlights in the Release, the structure of SPACs dilutes the financial
interests of unaffiliated security holders primarily due to the grant of founder shares to
sponsors for nominal consideration. By convention, parties to a de-SPAC refer to an
“implied” enterprise value based on an assumed $10 price per SPAC share. However, due to
dilution, the value that each SPAC share represents at the time of the de-SPAC on a net cash
basis is significantly lower than $10. 24 Confirming the importance of net cash per share,
econometric research has established that the value of SPAC shares has tended to fall over

22

Research underlying these comments in Section F is based on joint work with Harald Halbhuber for a project
tentatively titled “Fairness Opinions in SPAC Mergers.” Comments are my own.
23

See, e.g., Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, SEC Proposes Sweeping Changes Regulating SPAC Formation and DeSPAC Transactions, March 31, 2022, at 1 (“[A]lthough the proposed rules would not require a SPAC to obtain a
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the 12 months following a merger toward that lower level. 25 This dilution makes it possible if
not inevitable that the interests of unaffiliated SPAC investors will diverge from those of the
SPAC.
A de-SPAC may nevertheless be fair to unaffiliated security holders for either or both of two
reasons.26 First, the target shareholders—rather than public SPAC shareholders—may bear the
effects of dilution. This is possible, although well-advised target companies are aware that the
$10 value a convention. Second, the SPAC merger may promise to create significant value, such
as that arising from public company status or from the expertise that sponsors may bring to the
post-combination company. This latter reason seems more likely (but still far from certain or
even probable) than assuming ignorance or weak bargaining on the part of target companies.
Whether a proposed merger will create enough value to overcome the dilutive effect of
typical in SPACs is highly speculative. The greater the dilution, the greater these gains would
need to be to make the merger fair to unaffiliated security holders. To give such an opinion, a
financial advisor would need to consider first, the extent of dilution inherent in the transaction, a
calculation would need to be performed on a contingent basis, since the actual redemption level
would not then be known, and second, whether sources of value exist to overcome that deficit
from the perspective of unaffiliated security holders.
A study of market practices reveals that financial advisors giving fairness opinions have
generally not disclosed analyses that would allow them to opine on the fairness of a de-SPAC to
unaffiliated security holders. In de-SPACs, fairness opinions have tended to be given sparingly
when a target company is affiliated with a sponsor.27 In all but a small handful of de-SPACs,
these opinions opined on the fairness of a transaction to the SPAC, rather than the transaction’s
25

Id.

26

Michael Klausner, Michael Ohlrogge & Harald Halbhuber, Net Cash Per Share: The Key to Disclosing SPAC
Dilution, 40 YALE J. REG. BELLTIN 18, 21 (2022).
27
Jenny Hochenberg & Justin C. Clarke, SPAC Litigation: Current State and Beyond, 56 The Review of Securities &
Commodities
Regulation
33
(2022),
https://www.cravath.com/a/web/s1q7XMGjLjQMubcJsjWCFp/3DuuWK/hochenberg clarke rscr final-b.pdf
(“Fairness opinions are less common in SPACs, however, except when the target company has some affiliation with
the sponsor.”).
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fairness to unaffiliated security holders. These opinions therefore avoided the issue that proposed
Item 1606 would require SPACs to address.
In the 330 de-SPACs completed from January 1, 2019 to June 8, 2022, SPACs obtained
fairness opinions from a financial advisor in 40 (or 12.1 percent) of the transactions. 28 I reviewed
each of these fairness opinions. In 37 (or 92.5 percent) of these 40 opinions, the opinion stated,
without more, that the consideration paid was fair from a financial point of view to the SPAC. In
two (or 5 percent) of these fairness opinions the financial advisor opined that the transaction was
fair to unaffiliated security holders. These fairness opinions were given by Scalar Group and
Mediabanca.29 One (or 2.5 percent) of the 40 fairness opinions—given by ThinkEquity LLC—
stated simply that the transaction was fair, without stating to whom. 30
All 40 opinions were provided by small or “boutique” advisors rather than major investment
banks. Moelis & Company, Duff & Phelps, and Houlihan Lokey were the most frequent authors
of these letters, giving them in 10, 6, and 5 de-SPACs, respectively. Other financial advisors that
gave fairness opinions (and the number of de-SPACs for which they did so) were BTIG (1),
Cassel Salpeter (2), Craig-Hellum Capital Group (1), Guggenheim Securities (2), Lake Street
Capital Markets (1), Mediabanca (1), Northland Capital (1), Northland Securities (1), Primary
Capital (1), Rothschild (2), Scalar Group (1), SVB Leerink (1), ThinkEquity LLC (3), and
Vantage Point Advisors (1).
Major investment banks advised on many of the de-SPACs for which fairness opinions were
given. These included Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse Securities, Deutsche Bank
Securities, Banc of America Securities, and Citigroup Global Markets. But none of these firms
provided a fairness opinion.
28

This analysis relies on data from Deal Point Data to identify relevant transactions.
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The transactions were for acquisition of Ermenegildo Zegna Holditalia S.p.A. by Investindustrial Acquisition
Corp, completed on December 17, 2021, for which Mediobanka provided a fairness opinion, and the acquisition of
Revelation Biosciences by Petra Acquisition Inc., completed on January 10, 2022, for which Scalar Group provided
a fairness opinion.
30

The transaction was for FG New American Acquisition Corp.’s acquisition of Opportunity Financial, LLC,
completed on July 20, 2021.
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The financial advisors giving these opinions were generally careful to avoid any
interpretation that they were opining as to fairness to SPAC shareholders. Again, all but three of
these letters opined only on fairness to the SPAC, an entirely different question since SPAC
interests can be expected to diverge from those of unaffiliated security holders. Many of these
opinions also stated that they were giving no opinion as to the value of shares to SPAC
shareholders or were assuming, for purposes of their analysis, that each SPAC share was valued
at $10, an assumption that sidesteps the issue of dilution.
For example, the fairness opinion provided by Moelis in the 2021 merger between Gores
Metropoulos II, Inc., a SPAC, and Sonder Holdings Inc, stated that the opinion “does not address
the fairness of the [SPAC merger] or any aspect or implication thereof to, or any other
consideration of or relating to, the holders of any class of securities, creditors or other
constituencies of the [SPAC] or Target.”31 The opinion provided by Houlihan Lokey in the 2021
merger between Auror Innovation, Inc and Reinvent Technology Partners Y assumed a value per
share of $10 and expressly disregarded the dilutive impact of founder shares. 32 Of course, the
opinions were also careful to avoid lending weight to the projections they used as inputs in their
valuation analyses, noting that these projections were supplied by management and had not been
independently verified.
Of the 40 fairness opinions given in de-SPACs since 2019, only two opined that the merger
transaction was fair to unaffiliated security holders. These were for the merger of Petra
Acquisition Inc, a SPAC, and Revelation Biosciences, Inc. and that of Investindustrial
Acquisition Corp, a SPAC, and Ermenegildo Zegna Holditalia S.p.A. In another transaction, the
merger of FG New American Acquisition Corp. with Opportunity Financial, the financial advisor
failed to state from whose perspective the merger consideration was fair, leaving open the
31

Rule 424(b)(3) prospectus for merger of Gores Metropoulos II, Inc. and Sonder Holdings Inc., dated Dec. 23,
2021, at J-2.
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Rule 424(b)(3) prospectus for merger of Aurora Innovation, Inc. and Reinvent Technology Partners Y, dated Oct.
12, 2021, at K-1 (“We… have assumed that the value of each share of Acquiror capital stock … is equal to $10.00
per share (with such $10.00 value being based on Acquiror’s initial public offering and Acquiror’s approximate cash
per outstanding Acquiror Class A Ordinary Share (excluding, for the avoidance of doubt, the dilutive impact of
outstanding Acquiror Class B Ordinary Shares or any warrants to purchase Acquiror Class A Ordinary Shares or
Acquiror Class B Ordinary Shares)) [emphasis added].
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possibility, at least based on its concluding statement of opinion, that it was speaking to the
perspective of unaffiliated security holders.
Analysis of these opinions underscores concerns about the limits of SPAC fairness opinions
in addressing substantive fairness concerns. Despite their concluding opinions, none can
reasonably be taken to provide unaffiliated security holders with reassurance about the relevant
merger’s fairness. This is not to say that appropriate opinions cannot be given; in principle, they
can. Rather, opinions given to date would not be responsive to proposed Item 1606.
Consider first the Revelation Biosciences merger, in which Scalar Group provided an opinion
that the merger consideration “is fair to [the SPAC] and [the SPAC’s] unaffiliated stockholders
from a financial point of view.”33 The letter demonstrates no explicit basis for this opinion. The
letter compares the target company with selected comparable public companies in the biotech
and pharmaceutical industries, allegedly chosen for the similarity of their operations to those of
the target. The opinion applies numerous adjustments to determine “a range of selected implied
equity values” for the target of $43 million to $126 million, which “compares to the equity
consideration of $106 million to be issued to [the target’s] shareholders per the Business
Combination Agreement.” Next, the financial advisor reviews de-SPACs and IPOs involving
certain selected healthcare companies, listing their transaction prices and providing summary
statistics. Based on this analysis, the fairness opinion concludes that the merger consideration is
fair to the SPAC and its public stockholders from a financial point of view.
What is missing is any analysis of the dilution caused by the founder shares, etc. The
disclosed opinion fails to consider whether unaffiliated security holders bore the effects of this
dilution, as we would expect if the target bargained hard, aware of the dilution inherent in the
conventional de-SPAC structure. And the opinion is devoid of any consideration of the
possibility of uplift coming from public company status or the sponsor’s ongoing role in advising
the target. The opinion thus provides no apparent basis for its conclusion regarding fairness to

33

Rule 424(b)(3) prospectus for merger of Revelation Biosciences and Petra Acquisition, dated Dec. 16, 2021, at
111.
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unaffiliated security holders. Rather, its valuation analyses broadly mirror those of fairness
opinions that expressed no opinion regarding fairness to unaffiliated security holders.
Consider next the de-SPAC between Ermenegildo Zegna Holditalia and Investindustrial
Acquisition Corp. Financial advisor Mediobanca opines that the merger consideration is “fair,
from a financial point of view, to the holders of the ordinary shares of [the SPAC].” 34 This letter
also fails to disclose any firm basis for such an opinion. First, the financial advisor “assumed that
the value of each Ordinary Share is equal to $10.00 per share,” sidestepping the core issue of a
lack of a market price for the SPAC stock, stripping the opinion of meaning. Second, as with the
Revelation de-SPAC, the valuation analyses fail to speak to the fairness or otherwise of the
merger consideration to unaffiliated security holders. Again, what is missing is any analysis of
the dilution caused by the founder shares, etc., or where these costs fall.
Neither of these opinions provides real comfort that the relevant transactions were fair from a
financial point of view to unaffiliated security holders—despite their concluding statements.
In the merger of SPAC FG New American Acquisition Corp. with Opportunity Financial,
ThinkEquity opined that the merger consideration paid by the SPAC “is fair from a financial
point of view,” without saying to whom.35 This opinion, and the accompanying proxy statement
disclosures, disclose scant valuation analyses. Nothing in them assesses the value of SPAC
shares in the merger to unaffiliated security holders, and so this opinion, too, could not
reasonably receive much weight in demonstrating fairness to unaffiliated security holders. 36
Moreover, the letter does disclose conflicts; this is a rare deal in which the financial advisor also
served as an underwriter in the SPAC IPO and in connection with the IPO, received both
common stock and warrants in the SPAC that would be worthless if no merger occurred within
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Rule 424(b)(3) prospectus for merger of Investindustrial Acquisition Corp and Ermenegildo Zegna Holditalia
S.p.A, dated Nov. 29, 2021, at 145.
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Proxy Statement pursuant to Section 14(a) for merger of Opportunity Financial and New America Acquisition
Corp, dated June 22, 2021, at K-3.
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The opinion employs the comparable companies approach and the DCF approach without considering the
implications for unaffiliated security holders.
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the defined investment window.37 This conflict undermines the force of the letter’s expressed
opinion. Despite the apparent breadth of its conclusion, this opinion fails to address the issue of
substantive fairness to unaffiliated security holders.
In short, only three of the fairness opinions given in de-SPACs since January 1, 2019 state an
opinion that, on its face, even addresses fairness to unaffiliated security holders. On deeper
inspection, none of these opinion letters can reasonably be regarded as addressing substantive
fairness concerns for unaffiliated security holders. These fairness opinions lack convincing
analysis and include statements undermining the force of their concluding opinions. None were
provided by a major investment bank, even though these banks advised SPACs on many of the
deals.
In view of this evidence, I make two recommendations. First, and most importantly, any
fairness opinions provided in de-SPACs must be required to clearly state that they study
fairness from the perspective of unaffiliated security holders. Opinions should grapple with
the dilutive effects of the transaction. To buttress the required board opinion, fairness
opinions might therefore state the net cash per share at the time of the de-SPAC and precisely
why the financial advisor considers the de-SPAC fair to unaffiliated security holders.
Opinions should not assume a SPAC value of $10 per share for purposes of their analysis.
Without such analysis, a bald statement as to fairness, even such a statement speaking to the
position of unaffiliated security holders, lacks credibility and should not be regarded as
allowing SPAC boards to satisfy their obligation under proposed Item 1606.
Second, consistent with my arguments above, proposed Item 1606 should be reserved for
those de-SPACs in which conflict concerns are the most serious. Opinions addressing
fairness to unaffiliated security holders are tough to give. Whether financial advisors will be
willing to give them is doubtful; to date, no major investment bank has done so, and the
small handful of opinions that appear to address the issue would seem to lack supporting
analysis. For de-SPACs that have already adopted effective measures to mitigate severe
conflicts, imposing proposed Item 1606 would be unduly burdensome.
37

Id. at at K-2.
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II. Aligning de-SPAC Transactions with Initial Public Offerings
A. A Need for Increased Deterrence Force
Absent the Proposed Rules, Section 11 provides a significantly weaker deterrent force in
de-SPACs than traditional IPOs.38 Proposed Rules designed to buttress the deterrent force of
Section 11 in de-SPACs are generally well-tailored. First, the Proposed Reforms would help
prevent disparities in regulation for transactions that vary in legal structure but not in
economic substance. Second, Proposed Rules regarding underwriter liability are justified
and, more specifically, the justification for underwriter liability for de-SPACs is as strong as
it is for traditional IPOs. I touch on the reasons here, which are spelled out in more detail in
the attached article.
B. Accounting for Differences in de-SPAC Transaction Structure
First, as Joel Seligman and I argue in The Further Erosion of Investor Protection, the
liability risk of transaction participants depends on a de-SPAC’s legal structure. Various
structures exist for de-SPACs, including a conventional or “SPAC-on-top” structure, a
“target-on-top” structure, and a double-dummy structure. 39 Relevantly, these structures differ
according to whether the transaction involves a registered offering and for those that do
involve a registered offering, whether the party that registers the securities offered is the
SPAC, the target, or another entity. Variations exist along other dimensions too. For reasons
we explain, the upshot is that reforms need to account for variations in legal structure to
assure that structures equivalent in economic substance are treated equivalently.
i.

Private Operating Company as Co-Registrant to Form S-4 and Form F-4

Proposed reforms to Forms S-4 and F-4, making target operating companies coregistrants with SPACs, goes some way toward ensuring equivalence in treatment. These
reforms have implications for the conventional SPAC-on-top structure, in which the SPAC or
a subsidiary of the SPAC issues securities in a proposed offering and itself becomes the
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See Tuch & Seligman, supra note 2, at 26-46; Klausner et al., supra note 24, at 285-87.
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See Tuch & Seligman, supra note 2, at 29-31.
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registrant. By making target companies co-registrants, the Proposed Rules ensure that target
operating companies and their directors and officers have strong incentives under Section 11
to deter disclosure errors and other misconduct, even in conventionally-structured de-SPACs.
To be sure, these proposed reforms making target operating companies co-registrants would
subject both SPACs and target operating companies to strict liability, increasing the range of
potential defendants under Section 11 relative to traditional IPOs (in which there is a single
registrant). While this risks over-deterring misconduct in de-SPACs, the proposed reforms
limit liability to those parties that have the capacity to actively deter disclosure wrongs,
making the proposed regime closely analogous to that for traditional IPOs. SPACs and target
operating companies, and their respective directors and officers, are aware of the accuracy
and completeness of the disclosures required in a de-SPAC or at least have such control over
disclosure in a registration statement that they can help ensure the statement’s accuracy and
completeness.
ii.

Deeming business combination of shell company to involve a “sale”

Proposed Rule 145a would deem any business combination of a reporting shell company
involving another entity that is not a shell company to involve a “sale” of securities to the
reporting shell company’s shareholders. This reform would also help prevent certain
disparities in regulation for transactions that vary in legal structure but not in economic
substance, ensuring that unaffiliated security holders enjoy the protections that come from
investing in a registered offering.40
Any reform that goes further by also making sponsors an enumerated defendant under
Section 11, such as by requiring the sponsor to sign a Form S-4 or Form F-4 filed in
connection with a de-SPAC, as Request for Comment #68 suggests, would be going too far,
tilting the regulatory balance against de-SPACs and in favor of alternative transactions
including traditional IPOs. As it is, sponsors may find themselves liable under Section 11 as
control persons (or liable under Section 12(a)). Under the Proposed Rules, for de-SPACs the
strict liability net under Section 11 is cast wider than it is for traditional IPOs since it would
40
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encompass targets. Making SPAC sponsors signatories of registration statements may
counteract incentives created by proposed Subpart 1600, which may lead sponsors to
relinquish some control over de-SPACs, such as by making SPAC boards are more willing to
promote the interests of unaffiliated SPAC investors.
C. Underwriter Status and Liability under Section 11
I broadly agree with the Proposed Rules intended to enhance Section 11 liability for
underwriters. While the Proposed Rules go further than simply clarifying the law, I suggest
that they are justified to the extent they would regard SPAC IPO underwriters as underwriters
of de-SPACs. The case justifying Section 11 underwriter liability needs to be carefully made.
Rather than simply establishing in an absolute sense that an increased risk of Section 11
liability for transaction participants in de-SPACs is justified, the SEC can better make the
case by reference to traditional IPOs. In The Further Erosion of Investor Protection:
Expanded Exemptions, SPAC Mergers and Direct Listings, Professor Joel Seligman and I
give the following reasons for enhancing Section 11 liability in de-SPACs, focusing on
underwriter liability in particular (omitting references):
First, we contend that the benefits of underwriter liability are at least as great
for SPAC mergers as they are for traditional IPOs. Both SPAC mergers and
traditional IPOs introduce largely unknown and untested companies to public
markets, and in such settings, information asymmetries between investors and
companies seeking capital are likely to be substantial. In both transactions,
information comes from the companies themselves, parties with incentives “to
act opportunistically by misrepresenting the accuracy … of the information.”
After all, traditional IPOs and SPACs represent companies’ best shot at
capitalizing on their innovations, so firms face pressure to attract funds on the
most favorable terms. These environments of high information asymmetries
are precisely the ones in which the investor protections of federal securities
law “are typically most needed.” If anything, the benefits of underwriter
liability may be greater in the SPAC setting because SPAC sponsors and
SPAC IPO underwriters have incentives misaligned with those of SPAC
23

investors, which magnifies the risk of disclosure error.
Second, the costs of underwriter liability are no greater for SPAC mergers than
they are for traditional IPOs. In both settings, investment banks have roles that
allow them to perform due diligence. These firms have developed time-tested
methods for assuring the accuracy of registration statements and other disclosures,
methods that would seem equally applicable in both settings. Indeed, some legal
advisors have advised participants to consider performing IPO-style due diligence
in SPAC mergers without regarding cost as a barrier to banks.
Assuming the accuracy of these claims regarding costs and benefits, the case for
underwriter liability is as strong for SPAC mergers as it is for traditional IPOs. On
this reasoning, underwriter liability would generate benefits for SPAC mergers at
least as great as those accrued to traditional IPOs, without imposing additional
costs. If Section 11 underwriter liability is justified for traditional IPOs, the same
is true for SPAC mergers.
Professor Seligman and I also argue that Section 11 underwriter liability is indeed
justified for traditional IPOs.41
The Proposed Rules are right to enhance the prospect of Section 11 underwriter liability
in de-SPACs, although the discussion in the Release creates unnecessary ambiguity. The
Release suggests that a range of actors other than SPAC IPO underwriters may be liable as
statutory underwriters without specifying when this would occur. In doing so, the Release
may cast doubt on the longstanding understanding that financial advisors in mergers and
acquisitions (M&A advisors) are not statutory underwriters, 42 without explaining when these
advisors would be statutory underwriters or what implications exist for the role of M&A
advisors in M&A transactions other than de-SPACs.
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A risk with the Commission’s approach is that SPAC IPO underwriters would now have
powerful incentives to cease advising SPACs they have taken public that have yet to
undertake de-SPACs. Some investment banks are already considering taking this approach,
according to reports.43
A preferable regulatory approach may be to treat a SPAC IPO and de-SPAC transaction
as integrated by deeming SPAC IPO underwriters to be statutory underwriters for purposes
of any associated de-SPAC. This would ensure that de-SPACs have the benefit of
underwriter-level due diligence.
In The Further Erosion of Investor Protection: Expanded Exemptions, SPAC Mergers
and Direct Listings, Professor Joel Seligman and I suggest an alternative:
We recommend that a SPAC’s IPO underwriters bear liability under Section 11
for any misstatements or omissions in registration statements used in connection
with a SPAC merger. This could be achieved by viewing a SPAC IPO and its
associated SPAC merger as one integrated transaction. The purpose would be to
treat underwriters of the SPAC IPO as underwriters of the SPAC merger under
Section 11. These investment banks may be formally retained by the SPAC as
M&A advisors and in any event, often advise on or otherwise facilitate the SPAC
merger—having incentives to do so because of their deferred compensation. If
these investment banks were to face suit, they would benefit from the due
diligence defense under Section 11. In practice, such liability would likely result
in an underwriter undertaking due diligence to avoid liability, including seeking
negative assurance and comfort letters from the SPAC’s counsel and auditors,
respectively, attesting to the accuracy of the relevant registration statement. These
heightened standards would apply to SPAC mergers only, a distinguishable class
of merger in which special investor risks arise, rather than to mergers generally.
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These proposed standards would also align due diligence standards with those of
traditional IPOs, buttressing investor protections.
However, if SPAC IPO underwriters are to be statutory underwriters for de-SPACs, the
Commission might consider giving these parties control over whether a de-SPAC proceeds.
In traditional IPOs, underwriters are true gatekeepers in the sense that they can prevent a
transaction from proceeding if they are, for example, dissatisfied with the content of the
registration statement; underwriters can then simply refuse to underwrite the offering, giving
them powerful sway over an issuer impatient to execute a transaction. The same is true of
auditors, which must give an opinion before an IPO can proceed. In de-SPACs, it is not
apparent that SPAC IPO underwriters have a similar “gate” to “keep” during a de-SPAC,
even if they are serving as M&A advisors in the transaction. It may be that transaction
participants can proceed with a de-SPAC over the objections of the SPAC IPO underwriters
and M&A advisors. If the Commission intends to make SPAC IPO underwriters liable as
statutory underwriters, it might consider allowing these actors to dissociate themselves from
a transaction, such as by making a statement to that effect. This mechanism would give
SPAC IPO underwriters and other potential statutory underwriters influence consistent with
that of conventional underwriters in a traditional IPO, giving SPACs and targets strong
incentives not to proceed with a de-SPAC if the statutory underwriter has concerns about the
registration statement’s accuracy or completeness.
In Request for Comment #85, the Release raises the issue of “tracing.” In The Further
Erosion of Investor Protection, Professor Seligman and I do not regard tracing with as much
concern as other commentators do.44
Finally, the Commission’s approach toward underwriter liability in the setting of direct
listings is worth considering. In permitting direct floor listings, the Commission rejected
concerns about the inadequacy of underwriter liability, stating that “the financial advisors to
issuers in Primary Direct Floor Listings have incentives to engage in robust due diligence,
given their reputational interests and potential liability, including as statutory underwriters
44
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under the broad definition of that term.”45 Although the Commission might consider
engaging in more rulemaking for direct listings, its emphasis in the Release is consistent with
its approach toward primary direct floor listings of insisting on the importance of statutory
underwriter liability in deterring wrongs in IPO-equivalent transactions.
D. PSLRA Safe Harbor
I support the Proposed Rules intended to limit the application of the PSLRA safe harbor
to de-SPACs. Just as the legal structure of de-SPACs determines the threat of liability to
transaction participants, it also determines the application of the PSLRA safe harbor. Recall
that there are at least three main transactional forms for de-SPACs.46 In the target-on-top and
double-dummy structures, a private target and a newly formed holding company make initial
offerings of securities to the public during a de-SPAC. These structures contrast with the
conventional structure whereby an issuer of securities in the de-SPAC (the SPAC) has
already undertaken an initial offering of securities. The argument that de-SPACs are not
“initial public offerings” within the PSLRA exclusions is more plausible for transactions that
do not adopt the conventional structure. In interviews undertaken in writing the Further
Erosion of Investor Protection: Expanded Exemptions, SPAC Mergers, and Direct Listings,
practitioners were candid that many de-SPACs do not rely on PSLRA safe harbors for
forward-looking statements.47 Nevertheless, SPACs have routinely made use of forwardlooking statements in de-SPACs, without apparent regard for how they are structured. This
practice suggests that the availability of the PSLRA safe harbor may not be a significant
factor in determining the use of forward-looking statements in de-SPACs; at a minimum, it
suggests that the PSLRA safe harbor is not necessarily regarded by transaction participants as
essential protection in de-SPACs. If that is right, it overstates the case to argue that the
Proposed Rules would put SPACs between a rock and a hard place, depriving SPACs of
protections for statements that state law requires them to disclose. At a minimum, the
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Commission needs to understand why transaction participants have willingly disclosed
projections in circumstances when the safe harbor is generally understood not to be available.
Relatedly, I agree that de-SPACs should not be regarded as “initial public offerings” for
purposes of the PSLRA (see Request for Comment #77). That is a strained interpretation of
the term “initial public offering.” For example, a de-SPAC might involve an offer and sale of
the SPAC’s securities to holders of the target company’s securities in consideration of their
interests in the target company. In this case, the offer and sale to target shareholders may not
be regarded accurately as the SPAC’s initial public offering. While there may be other
reasons why de-SPACs should not be regarded as initial public offerings for purposes of the
PSLRA, this reason should be enough because it shows that regarding de-SPACs as IPOs for
purposes of the PSLRA may well produce disparities in the treatment of de-SPACs based on
the legal structure participants use—a result inconsistent with a motivating principle of the
Proposed Rules.
*

*

*

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Release. I would be pleased to discuss
these comments further.
Andrew F. Tuch
Professor of Law, Professor of Finance (courtesy)
Washington University in St. Louis
andrew.tuch@wustl.edu
[submission version with emendation]
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